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This research is aimed at investigating the consumer’s preference for food 
produced in Taiwan and the economic benefits for the country of origin labeling. The 
study uses both experimental auction and contingent valuation method (CVM) to 
investigate factors that affect the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for products 
under country-of-origin labeling (COOL).   
Experimental auctions of Taiwan and China preserved olives as well as Taiwan, 
China and Vietnam oolong teas were conducted using the Vickrey’s second price 
sealed bid auction. For CVM, the study used the double-bounded dichotomous choice 
method in which we started assuming the same base price for all products in the first 
question and then varied the prices in the second CV question. The products not 
chosen in the first question were offered with a discount in a range from 10% to 50% 
in the following question.   
Based on auction data, the Tobit model shows that the estimated premiums are 
58.1%, 78.15% and 98.13% for Taiwan products over their alternatives of China 
olives, China oolong tea, and Vietnam oolong tea, respectively. Based on the CVM, 
the estimated premiums for Taiwan over China olives from a Logit model is 67%, and 
the premiums for Taiwan produced oolong tea should lie between 50% to an unknown 
upper bound over China and Vietnam alternatives as the Multinomial Logit model 
cannot be successfully estimated due to too few choice switches with discounted 
prices. The study thus demonstrates the superiority of the experimental auction over 
the CVM in eliciting the WTP for foods produced in Taiwan. The study concludes that 
enacting a COOL law would increase economic benefits to consumers in Taiwan, and 
at the same time, placing the imported products in the level playing field.   
 






The increasing standards of living and concerns about food safety have raised the 
consumer’s demand for information about the safety, origin, and processes used to produce 
the food they consume. Since Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, 
its agricultural sector has faced great competition from foreign imports of food products, 
especially from China, the United States, and those from South East Asia like Thailand and 
Vietnam. The flooded foreign imports, especially those from developing countries are often 
with lower quality and higher probability of contamination than those produced domestically 
in Taiwan. Since food produced domestically in Taiwan is probably safer than those from 
South East Asia, Taiwanese consumers would be willing to pay a premium to avoid 
contamination of foreign food. Unfortunately, without a country-of-origin label, Taiwanese 
consumers currently can not tell where the food is from. Therefore, to protect Taiwanese 
consumers away from imported contaminated food, Taiwan government should enact a 
COOL law.   
Many countries already have enacted mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL) 
law. In the 2002 Farm Bill, the U.S. congress first introduced country-of-origin labeling on 
beef, lamb, pork, fish, perishable agricultural commodities, and peanuts. The bill states, 
“…for a commodity to be labeled a USA product, it must be born, raised, and processed in 
the United States” (U.S. Senate, Farm Bill Conference Framework, 2002). It later became 
mandatory in 2004, which has become known as MCOOL. In August 2007, the U.S. congress 
enacted a legislation requiring MCOOL for meat products.   
    Taiwan has recently passed an act to mandate COOL on all packaged food in 2006 and 
the law became effective in January, 2008. But Taiwan’s law covers only packaged processed 
foods.  The COOL of unpackaged and fresh products is not mandatory. Therefore, whether 
the government should also include the COOL of unpackaged food and make it compulsively 
would also be an important issue.   
The objectives of this paper are to develop a methodology for soliciting the consumer’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for food products produced in Taiwan as compared with those 
produced in foreign countries, to analyze factors affecting the consumer’s behavior on 
purchasing products under COOL, and to quantitatively estimate the premiums that 
Taiwanese consumers are willing to pay for food produced in Taiwan. On methodology, we 
will attempt to compare the auction experiment and the contingent valuation method (CVM) 
and to assess the existence of hypothetical bias in CVM. The estimates of the WTP premiums 
for Taiwan products can be used to assess the economic benefits for expanding Taiwan’s  
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COOL law and to evaluate the impacts of COOL on the agricultural trade between Taiwan 
and its trading partners especially China.   
 
Literature Review 
The 2002 U.S. COOL law has been studied by many economists. Schupp and Gillespie 
(2001) first conducted a research on the attitude of food handlers and restaurants on the 
country-of-origin labeling law for fresh and frozen meats in the U.S. They found that the 
COOL would be supported as long as the producer believes that consumers would benefit 
from the labeling. Umberger et al. (2003) used both survey and the auction (forth-price, 
sealed-bid) to estimate the willingness to pay premiums for country-of-origin labeled steaks. 
The price premium estimated from the auction method for the steak labeled with “USA 
guaranteed, born and raised in the U.S.” was 19%, which was larger than those from 
contingent valuation (CV) survey (11%). This result may be because consumers would like to 
see the product they are bidding on. They also showed that food-safety concerns, preferences 
for labeling source and origin information, strong desire to support U.S. products and beliefs 
on U.S. beef were reasons why consumers preferred COOL.   
Loureiro and Umberger (2003) conducted a CV survey of shoppers in grocery stores. 
They found that the willingness to pay premiums for steak and hamburger labeled as “U.S. 
Certified Steak” and “U.S. Certified Hamburger” was 38% and 58%, respectively. Although 
most authors suggested that legislation of COOL would generate price premium on the 
domestic products, having a price premium does not mean there will be enhanced social 
welfare. Schmitz et al. (2005) showed that there exists a break - even cost that maintains the 
welfare at its original level during the COOL shock (COOL may cause supply shift and 
demand shift). So, when the labeling cost is less than the break-even cost, having the 
country-of-origin labeling will increase the welfare. On the contrary, it will not. Lusk et al. 
(2004) found that the cost of COOL could transfer from industry to industry. Costs of COOL 
could be shifted from producers to processors and retailers, and in this case, producers would 
be better off while consumers will be worse off. According to their study, an increase in 
aggregate consumer demand of 2% to 3% is likely sufficient to offset the losing producer 
welfare due to increased COOL costs. 
Methodology 
This study employs auction experiment. It is important to design an experimental 
auction mechanism correctly. Hoffman et al. (1993) used auction experiment to estimate the 
willingness to pay premiums for the vacuum-skin (VS) packaged steaks over the traditional  
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overwrapped styrofoam tray (OST) steaks. Through the auction, they found that the auction 
order of the products did not affect the estimation results. They also suggested that to design 
learning trials and instructions that explain incentive compatible auctions carefully was very 
important. Specifically, learning trials could teach respondents how to bid and the explanation 
of the auctions could minimize the impact of strategic behavior. To improve the accuracy on 
the auction results, Vickrey (1961) suggested that the second-price auction, in which the 
highest bidder would be awarded the object by just paying the second-highest bid price, is 
relatively easy to implement and it is a weakly dominant strategy for the participants to reveal 
their true valuations.   
Second-price auction helps to reveal the true WTP for the respondents. Therefore, it is 
adopted in this study. Corrigan et al. (2006) suggested that the bids of the purchase auction 
(coffee mug) would be influenced by posted prices for unrelated goods in trial auction (candy 
bar). To avoid the posted effect, they also suggested that we should calculate the WTP of the 
bid premiums instead of WTP of the bids. Therefore, we also estimate the WTP of the bid 
premiums of the products in this study. Since the willingness to accept (WTA) measures of 
value are often larger than WTP, whether to use WTP or WTA is also important to 
experimental auction. However, recent research suggests that the difference between WTP 
and WTA can be consistent with economic theory (Hanemann, 1991; Hoffman and Spitzer, 
1993). Thus, an observed difference between WTP and WTA is not a per se behavioral 
violation of the incentive compatibility of the auction mechanism. Shogren et al. (1994) even 
showed that for market goods with close substitutes, there was a convergence of WTP and 
WTA measures of value. In this study, various oolong teas as well as preserved olives are 
market goods with close substitutes, so we consider estimating only Taiwanese consumer’s 
WTP not WTA for the preserved olives and tea.   
     This study will also use the CVM and conduct a CV survey on the same subjects 
during the auction experiment. Single-bounded dichotomous choice format, which provides 
the respondents with some threshold value and asks them if they are willing to pay that 
amount, was first considered to be a better method than open-ended format, because it was 
easier for respondents to answer the questions. But through this method, the researcher can 
only know the respondent’s WTP is greater or smaller than the threshold (Haab and 
McConnell, 2002). To solve this problem, Hanemann, et al.(1991) showed that 
double-bounded dichotomous choice format would improve the welfare measure. Although it 
has been pointed out that double-bounded dichotomous choice format may cause  
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inconsistency problem
1, it still retains efficiency (Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Herriges and 
Shogren, 1996). Hanemann and Kanninen (1999) suggested that the gain in efficiency could 
override the problem of inconsistency. Alberini (1995) also showed that the format was 
robust for estimating the mean or median of the welfare measure. We therefore decided to use 
the double-bounded dichotomous choice in our CV survey. 
 
Design of Auction and Survey 
Choices of Products 
Preserved olives and oolong tea are often imported in bulk and unpackaged. Since the 
retailers often try to fool consumers as though they were produced in Taiwan, those products 
are usually sold without a country-of-origin label. Although there are a lot of other 
unpackaged foods could be used for the auction experiment, such as preserved mangos and 
dried mushrooms. But preserved mangos from Thailand look different from Taiwan mangos, 
which are moister and softer than Thailand mangos. It took us much time to find that 
preserved olives and oolong tea products from different countries with very similar look. 
Another reason is that there were newspaper reports about imported contaminated preserved 
fruits and oolong tea. Most of the imported contaminated food, such as China olives and 
Vietnam tea, has too much preservative and insecticide residuals, which may be harmful for 
human health. The preserved olives have been marinated with Chinese herb and the color of  
preserved olives is black. It is very hard for us to distinguish their country-of-origin by their 
appearances. Oolong teas are also very hard for us to tell their differences by their look.   
Experimental Design 
After the focus group session held in Chiayi (National Chung Cheng University), we 
conducted three formal experimental auctions in Taipei (Academia Sinica), on March 13, 
2008, Taichung (National Chung Hsing University), on March 14 and in Kaohsiung (National 
Kaohsiung Normal University), on March 18. Two sessions were held in each location; the 
experiments were conducted at 5:30 pm and 7:30 pm each day. Each experimental session 
recruited 12- 13 general public samples: The female ratio is set at 60%-76%. Although the 
ratio of females and males in Taiwan is almost 49% or 50% (Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, 
2008), the particular sex ratio in the experiment was chosen because that females often play 
the role of buying food for the household. Therefore, we recruited more female respondents 
in our study. We screened potential participants recruited by the Survey Center of Academia 
                                                 
1  Which means that the respondent’s willingness-to-pay function may not be identical between the initial and 
follow-up CV questions.  
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Sinica to get a desired mix of sample by income and sex for each session. These respondents 
signed up through the internet or telephone to the Academia Sinica and were chosen if they 
never participated in any kind of experimental session. The total sample includes 74 
participants. Participants were paid $1,000 for one and a half hours of their time and each of 
them was assigned an ID number. Each experiment started with three trial auctions of candy 
bar. The trial auctions were followed by six real auctions: three for preserved olives; three for 
oolong teas. The preserved olive auctions used olives from Taiwan and China. The oolong tea 
auctions involved teas from three different countries: Taiwan, China and Vietnam. Both of the 
olives and teas from different countries were packaged into a 150g bag. Candy bar auction 
was aimed at getting participants acquainted with the mechanism of the Vickrey second-price 
sealed-bid auction.   
In each auction, participants bid for two or three products, but only one product is 
actually sold. After the auctions, a straw was randomly drawn to determine which trial was 
binding, and then another random drawing was made to determine which product needed to 
be purchased in the chosen trial. The use of random draws was made to control for the wealth 
effect: since only one product was sold, each participant did not need to split the budget over 
the trials or over the products (Shogren et al., 1994). The selling price was the second highest 
bid price and the panelist would have won the auction if their bid exceeded the selling price. 
Therefore the winner would only have to pay the second highest bid to buy the product.   
Contingent Valuation Questions Design 
The contingent valuation questions are questions for simulated market. The study used 
the double-bounded dichotomous choice method to guide the participants to make 
hypothetical purchase decisions under given price scenarios. We asked the respondents to 
make a purchase choice among the selected products (preserved olives and oolong tea) 
labeled with various countries of origin given various prices. The study designed a double 
bounded CV survey in which we started assuming the same base prices in the first question 
and then varied the prices in the second CV question. The prices for the products not chosen 
in the first question were lower (as discounted by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% or 50%) in the 
following question. For preserved olives, there were four options of choice: Taiwan, China, 
“both of them are indifferent” or “buy neither of them”. If one chose Taiwan preserved olive 
as more preferable than the China preserved olives in the first purchase choice question, we 
would lower the price of the China preserved olive in the follow-up question with the same 
discount range. If one chose China preserved olives in the first question, we would lower the 
price of Taiwan preserved olives in the second question. For oolong tea, there were five  
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possible choices: Taiwan, China, Vietnam, “all of them are indifferent” or “buy none of 
them”. Similar to the case of preserved olives, if one chose Taiwan tea, we would lower 
prices of  China and Vietnam oolong teas at the same level of discount in the follow-up 
question. If one chose China tea, then Taiwan tea would be discounted in the second question. 
The same procedure would happen if one chose the Vietnam tea in the beginning. The price 
scenarios were randomly distributed among the participants. If the one selected 
“indifference” in the first question, the following question will ask whether they are still 
indifferent or whether they would choose the cheaper alternative. This part of the 
questionnaire also included other food purchasing behaviors, personal background and 
socio-demographic characteristics.   
 There were also two versions of the experiment in this study, three sessions with a 
total of 38 respondents were given auction first and then the CV survey, the other three 





Test of Affiliation 
It is important to examine whether the announced winning bid would affect the bidding 
behavior in the subsequent trials during auction experiment. It is possible that respondents 
found out that their bids were different from the posted price and therefore changed their bids 
in the next trial. Participants may also increase their bids if they observed the second highest 
bid was higher or lower than their last bid. If there was no affiliation then there would be no 
correlation between the bid adjustment and the difference between the winning bid and the 
participant’s last bid. Following Kaneko and Chern, the model to investigate the possible 
affiliation can be expressed as: 
i,t 1 i,t-1 2 i,t      B=+ P + t + α ββ ε Δ                                   ( 1 )  
where i and t index individual and trial, respectively;  , it B Δ is participant i’s bid in trial t 
minus his or her bid in trial t-1;  ,1 it P − is the posted price in trial t-1 minus participant i’s bid in 
trial t-1. Hence, if  1 β >0, the participant would increase his or her bid if his or her last bid 
was lower than the posted bid, and vice versa. Trial number t is added as an explanatory 
variable to see if there is a trend that the individual bid prices would have more experience on 
bidding in repeated trials.  
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Table 1 shows the results of the affiliation test. The coefficients for the variable P are 
all significant and positive. These results show that participants would tend to increase their 
bids for all products when their last bid was lower than the posted bid. Based on this finding 
we should include the trial dummy variables in the auction bid regressions. For China olives 
as well as tea from all three countries, the coefficients of the variable t are significantly 
positive, indicating that participants tend to increase their bids over repeated trials.   
 
Experimental Auction   
We construct regression models for analyzing participants’ biding behavior in 
experimental auction. Consider first the bids for preserved olives, we run regressions for 
preserved olives labeled Taiwan (
o
0 B ) and China (
o
1 B ). For oolong tea bids, we run 
regressions for Taiwan tea (
T
1 B ), China tea ( 2
T B ) and Vietnam tea (
T
3 B ) to investigate how 
various factors affecting the respondent’s bids for these auctioned products. Table 5 shows the 
unconditional mean bids for each product by country. There were over 10% of respondents 
submitted zero bid for every product. Because the hypothesis of the linearity can not be held 
when there are too many zeros in the data set. This is a typical censoring problem in 
econometrics. Therefore, we use Tobit model for analyzing the bidding behavior for 
o
i B (i=0, 
1), 
T
j B (j=1, 2, 3.). Since bided premiums of
oo
01 (B -B ) ,
TT
12 (B -B ) and 
TT
13 (B -B ) for Taiwan 
products can be positive or negative, we can simply use ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
to run those premium regressions.   
Tobit model can be expressed as: 
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i y   is a latent variable,  i y  is the observed censored variable and i x is a vector of 
independent  variables.   . 
In this study, when the respondent’s willingness to pay ( i y   ) is positive, the probability 
density function (pdf) is shown as: 
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where ('/) ('/) /('/) xxx λ βσφ βσ βσ =Φ is called the inverse Mills ratio; it is a ratio 
between the standard normal pdf and standard normal cdf.   
     Following Wooldridge (2006), if  j x   is a continuous variable, its marginal effect can 













Φ .                                           ( 5 )  
where  j x   is the jth independent variable. If  j x   is a binary variable, the effect of interest is 
obtained as the difference between ( | 0, 1) ii j Eyy x >= and ( | 0, 0) ii j Eyy x >= . Marginal effects 
involving other discrete variables can be handled similarly. 
      
Contingent Valuation Method 
     The basic framework for analysis is based on the random utility model (Haab and 
McConnell, 2002). Let  ij U  denote consumer i’s utility from choosing alternative j. Then 
consumer  i  chooses alternative j if  ij ik UU > for all k≠j. It is standard to assume 
that ij ij ij UVε =+.  ij V  is the deterministic component of the utility of respondent i  from 
choosing j.  ij ε   is the error term.   
     For preserved olives, the appropriate model is the binary logit model because the 
choice is between preserved olives labeled Taiwan and those labeled China alternatives. For 
oolong tea, the choice is between Taiwan (j=1) and China oolong tea (j=2) and between 
Taiwan (j=1) and Vietnam oolong tea (j=3), which is better handled by a multinomial logit 
model. We assume that the random components ij ε  are independently and identically 

















       j= 1 ,   2 ,   3                               ( 6 )   
where the respondent i’s observed choice ( i Y ) takes the value of 1 (Taiwan ),2 (China), or 3 
(Vietnam).  
          We further assume that the deterministic component is linear in parameters: 
ij 0j 1 ij 2j i +P + ' x V β ββ =                                             ( 7 )  
where  ij P  is the price of the jth alternative and  i x  is a vector of consumer i’s demographic 
characteristics and other subjective and risk relative components.   
Note that not all of the 0j β ’s and 2j β ’s are identifiable, so we adopt a normalization rule 
such that  01 0 β =  and  21 0 β =   (see Greene, p.860). Following the procedure used 
previously by Kaneko and Chern (2005) (j=1 for Taiwan, j=0 for China) we have the 
following utility functions for preserved olives: 
i0 1 i0 i0
i1 01 1 i1 21 i1
U= P+
U= + P+ ' x +
β ε
β ββε  ,                                        ( 8 )  
F o r   t h e   o o l o n g   t e a s ,   w e   h a v e   t h e   f o l l o w i n g   u t i l i t y   f u n c t i o n s :                                    
i1 1 i1 i
i2 02 1 i2 22 i i2
i3 03 1 i3 23 i i3
U= P+
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U= + P+ ' x +
β ε
β ββ ε
β ββ ε                                        ( 9 )  
     The model for the paired choice could be formulated by using the latent variable 
defined as 
10 0 1 1 1 0
21 20 1 1 0
01 2
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Then, the respondent i chooses Taiwan preserved olives ( i Y =1) if
*
i Y >0 and China alternative 
( i Y =0) if
*
i Y ≦0. The latent variable approach would not work for the multinomial logit model, 
and hence the choice probably is not directly linked with the sign of the coefficient in 
equation (10). 
Once the parameters are estimated, we can compute the sample mean of WTP. 
Consider the case of oolong teas. Let  2 i WTP  denote consumer i’s willingness to pay a 
premium on the Taiwan oolong tea. Then the following equation has to hold: 
12 2 1 1 2 0 21 i 2 2 2 ii 2 () + P + ' x + ii i i i PW T P U U β εβ β β ε ++ = = = . The left–hand side is the utility from  
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consuming Taiwan oolong tea at the price of Taiwan oolong tea plus the premium. The 
right-hand side is simply the utility from consuming the China oolong tea at its own price. 
The willingness to pay premium for Taiwan tea can be computed by: 







             ( 1 1 ) .  
Taking the expected value of the 2 i WTP , we obtain the expected willingness to pay 
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Dependent variables and independent variables used in the econometric models for the 
experimental auction and the CVM may be different. Table 2 shows the definitions of 
dependent variables and symbols that are different from auction and CVM. For the 
experimental auction, we denote Ot and Oc as the respondent’s bids for Taiwan and China 
preserved olives, respectively and Tt, Tc and Tv as the bids for Taiwan, China and Vietnam 
oolong teas, respectively. For the CVM, the dependent variables include binomial Y and 
multinomial Y for preserved olives and oolong teas, respectively. The symbol Y is based on 
the follow-up question in the CV format. Besides the dependent variables, Table 2 also shows 
definitions and coding of independent variables that are different between auction and CVM. 
Independent variables from the auction include behavior variables and trial variables. The 
behavior intention variables represent the respondent’s choice based on the first question in 
the CV format when all products were offered at the same price. The trial variables are 
included in the auction in order to investigate whether the posted prices affected the 
respondent’s bid in the subsequent trials. For the CVM, we use △PRICE to denote the price 
differences between Taiwan product and non-Taiwan product in the CV format. 
Although there are some independent variables which are specifically defined for either 
auction or CVM, most of the independent variables are the same in both regression models.  
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Table 3 shows the common independent variables that are shared between auction and CVM. 
The average age of the sample is 44 years old and almost 70% of respondents are females. 
About 73% of participants are married. An interesting statistic is that over 74% of the 
respondents are overweight. With respect to income distribution, 51% of participants had 
their average household income in 2007 more than $680,000 and the average monthly 
personal income is $41,000. Mean statistics also show that the average household expenditure 
for FAH is $12,965 and the average expenditure of FAFH is $5,344. With respect to 
education, the respondents with a high school diploma accounted for 48.5%, the highest 
percentage among all education groups.   
 
Survey data also shows that 67% of respondents checked food labels. Furthermore, 
respondents considered safety (98.7%), freshness (100%), nutrition (85.9%), and 
country-of-origin (87.2%) to be very or somewhat important for their food choices. Note that 
the means of FRESH and SAFETY are virtually ones. If we add these variables in the model, 
there will be a collinear problem. Therefore, these variables are excluded from both Tobit and 
CVM regressions.  Environmental consciousness, price, calorie, convenience, color and 
brand are less important for the respondents. Note that only 25.6% of respondents considered 
the government’s regulatory performance on food safety being excellent or good. The survey 
also shows that there are 24.3% of respondents who do not know about the country-of-origin 
labeling law in Taiwan. More than 78% of respondents regarded imported contaminated food 
as the most important food safety issue. 
Although there were 74 participants in the sample, but there were only 70 participants 
who filled out the CV questionnaire carefully and completely. All respondents had handed in 
their bidding cards during the experimental auction. Therefore, we still have 74 bids for all 
selected product and the mean bids of the total sample are shown previously in Table 2. Table 
4 shows the unconditional mean bids for each product by country, which is computed from 
the raw auction bids. Since there are four respondents without completing their forms or 
having irrational answers to our questions, we exclude them in the econometric analysis and 
therefore the descriptive statistics of bids from the auction in Table 4 only include 70 bids. 
The mean bids for Taiwan preserved olives ($46.71) and Taiwan oolong tea ($200.27) are 
higher than those from other countries. Therefore, most of the respondents consider Taiwan 
preserved olives and tea are more preferable than China preserved olives as well as China and 
Vietnam oolong teas. It is interesting to note that 66% of respondents who submitted zero for 
Taiwan olives and tea indicated that they have never eaten preserved olives or drank oolong  
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tea.  But most of the respondents who bid zero for China and Vietnam products questioned 
the safety of these products.   
Let us examine the patterns of responses to the initial CVM question where the 
products were sold at equal price. When the respondents facing 10% and 30%  price 
discounts on the China olives, they still considered buying Taiwan preserved olives. When 
facing a 20% discount on the China preserved olives, only one respondent switched the 
original preference to China. When facing a 40% discount on China preserved olives, there 
were only 14.3% of respondents turned to China olives. When facing a 50% discount on the 
China preserved olives, the percentage of respondent’s preference switching increased to 
15.4%. There were 8 respondents who chose the neither option. For the preserved olives, 
most of them (50%) indicated that they never buy preserved olives and for the oolong teas, 
almost 50% of participants who chose the neither option mentioned that they never drink tea.   
Survey results also show that almost every respondent chose Taiwan oolong tea when 
all teas were sold at the same price, except one respondent chose China Oolong tea initially. 
All respondents facing a 20% price discount on non-Taiwan oolong tea still chose Taiwan 
oolong tea. When facing a 30% discount on the non-Taiwan Oolong tea, only one (6.6%) of 
respondents switched to China oolong tea. Moreover, 76.9% of respondents did not switch 
even when other teas were offered with a 40% price discount. Only one person, who chose 
China tea in the first question, switched preference to Taiwan tea in the follow-up question. 
Only one respondent (7.7%) chose Vietnam Oolong tea at a 50% price discount from initially 
chosen Taiwan tea. Therefore, almost all respondents chose Taiwan products at the same price, 
and over 85% of them did not change their preference under the selected price discounts. It 
shows that respondents would stick to Taiwan products even under 10%-50% price discount, 
their preferences on Taiwan products are very strong. 
Regression Results of Experimental Auction   
     Table 5 shows parameter estimates of bid regressions for preserved olives and oolong 
tea using data from all trials. Since there are 70 respondents and each of them can bid three 
times, these regressions are based on 210 observations. For preserved olives, the Tobit results 
for the Taiwan bid equation in the first column show that the estimated coefficients for 
INFO2, AGE, EDU3, FAH, GOV, BRAND and RISK are significant, those variables are also 
significant for the OLS results for the bid premium of Taiwan olives over China olives in the 
third column. Positive signs of the INFO2 imply that people whose information is mostly 
from food package labels will bid more on Taiwan olives. Negative signs of the coefficient of 
AGE show that younger respondents tend to bid more on Taiwan olives. Older people often  
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care more about their blood sugar and show less interest on preserved olives than younger 
people. Respondents with college education (EDU3) tend to have higher bids on Taiwan 
olives, which also cause a higher bid premium for Taiwan olives over China olives. Positive 
signs for the estimated coefficients of FAH in the Taiwan olive equation and the olive 
premium equation show that respondents who spend more of food expenditure on food at 
home tend to bid higher on Taiwan preserved olives, which is consistent with the assumption 
that people who spend more on food at home would probably care more about where their 
foods come from than those who spend less on food at home. Positive signs for GOV show 
that respondents who think the government’s regulatory performance is excellent will trust 
Taiwan’s food safety legislation and will probably believe that Taiwan produced food should 
be relatively safe under the government’s protection. Therefore, these respondents tend to 
place higher premium on Taiwan produced olives. 
          The second column in Table 8 shows the Tobit results for the China olive bids. The sign 
of the coefficient for BUYPF is negative, which shows that respondents who purchase 
preserved food more often should have more experience in judging the quality of preserved 
olives and thus they may bid less on China olives than on Taiwan olives. Therefore, the 
positive sign for BUYPF in the bid premium can obviously be expected.     
    Positive signs of BMI in Taiwan olive bid equation and China olive bid equation show 
that respondents with slim or normal figures tend to bid more on preserved olives. The reason 
may be that overweight people usually eat more than slim or normal people, and if under the 
same budget, overweight people will have to distribute their money for other real meals, and 
therefore tend to bid less on olives than respondents with normal or slim figures. Although 
the signs for CHECK are negative in both individual bid equations (for Taiwan and China), 
the coefficient in the China olive bid equation is still smaller than that in Taiwan olive bid 
equation. This result shows that respondents who consider checking the labeling of food as 
important factor on food purchasing would decrease their bids on all olives, but lowering 
their bids on China alternative more than Taiwan olives. Since signs for SECTION are 
significant in both the olive equations and the tea equations, we will discuss them later. 
     To sum up, since the coefficients of INFO2, GOV, FAH, EDU3, BUYPF and RISK in 
the olive bid premium equation are all positive, suggesting that respondents whose 
information are mostly from food package labels, who spend more on food expenditure at 
home, respondents with higher education level, and who purchase preserved olives frequently 
and think imported contaminated foods as the most important food safety issue in Taiwan 
tend to have higher price premium on Taiwan olives.    
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     Table 5 also presents the parameter estimates of bid regressions for oolong tea. 
Variables CALORIE, ZONE2, ZONE3, FAH and SECTION are either significant or 
marginally significant determinants for Taiwan, China and Vietnam oolong tea bids. In all 
three tea bid equations, positive signs for CALORIE show that respondents who consider 
calorie to be an important factor when making food purchasing decisions tend to have higher 
bids. Since respondents who were more concerned about how much Calorie they eat often 
pay more attention on keeping their figures slim and fit, they tend to have higher willingness 
to pay on tea. Positive signs of the coefficients for ZONE2 and ZONE3 also show that 
respondents from Taipei and Kaohsiung tend to have higher bid on tea than respondents from 
Taichung. Since the signs for FAH are negative, respondents who spend most food 
expenditure on food at home tend to decrease their bids on all three teas. Perhaps food away 
from home is always too greasy than food we cook by ourselves. Therefore, respondents who 
spend more on food at home expenditure do not want to increase their bids on tea. 
     For the preserved olives as well as oolong teas, positive signs for SECTION suggest 
respondents who did the auction first and the CVM later tend to have higher bids on olives 
and tea. In other words, respondents may lower their bids after seeing the offered prices we 
had given on the CV questions.   
     The  coefficients  of  INFO2,  EDU3,  AGE and CALORIE in the Taiwan tea bid equation 
are significant and positive. Therefore, respondents whose food information is mostly from 
food package labels, and who are older and better educated may bid more on Taiwan tea. The 
positive sign of AGE shows that older respondents like to drink more tea, and thus tend to bid 
higher than younger people and the negative sign of BUYTEA in the Taiwan tea bid equation 
shows that the respondents who purchase tea more frequently would tend to decrease their 
bids for tea products. This is perhaps because most of heavy tea drinking respondents have 
their own tea suppliers, they would not be interested in the teas we offered in the auction.   
          The last two columns in Table 8 present the estimation results for Taiwan tea premiums. 
Variables GOV, AGE, EDU3, VEGE, MAR, BUYPF, NUM, RISK and BRAND are either 
significant or marginally significant. Positive signs of AGE and EDU3 show respondents 
with higher education level and older age have a higher price premium for Taiwan tea. Since 
older people love to drink tea, they have ample experience on choosing them. Most of the 
older respondents said that their preferences on Taiwan tea were not only for the concerns of 
food safety but also for the good quality of Taiwan tea, they suggested that Taiwan tea tastes 
better than China and Vietnam teas (Even though we stressed that they tasted the same during 
the auctions). Therefore, they think Taiwan tea is better than those from other countries and  
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are willing to pay more for it. Negative signs of GOV mean that respondents who think that 
the government is doing a god job on legislation tend to decrease their premiums. This is 
perhaps because respondents who think the government’s regulatory performance is excellent 
may trust that government will strictly restrain the import of contaminated food, and therefore 
no matter what country-of-origin labeling of the food, they are safe enough to eat or drink. 
We note that the coefficients of GOV have the opposite signs between the tea premiums and 
olive premium equations. This seemingly strange result is mainly caused by those who think 
the government’s regulatory performance being excellent bid significantly higher for Taiwan 
olives while this GOV variable is not significant in all other bid equations. Unfortunately, 
there is still no good explanation on the opposite results between olive and tea premiums. 
Coefficients of VEGE in all tea premium regressions are positive, suggesting that if 
respondents were vegetarian, their willingness to pay for Taiwan tea are more than those from 
China and Vietnam. Positive signs of the coefficients of MAR and BUYPF show that 
respondents who are married and who purchase preserved olives frequently tend to increase 
their bid premium on Taiwan tea. Since variables BRAND and RISK are significant in both 
the Taiwan olive premium and tea premium equations, we will discuss them together at the 
end of the paragraph. Table 5 shows that BRAND has a negative impact and RISK has a 
positive impact on all Taiwan product premiums. This is perhaps because respondents who 
place more importance on brand believe that brand already gives them enough food 
protection. On the other hand, respondents who consider imported contaminated food as a 
very important issue in Taiwan currently will bid higher (lower) on Taiwan (non-Taiwan) tea 
and olives. 
     In  the  affiliation  test,  we  show  that  the  participants would tend to increase their bids for 
all the products when their last bids were lower than the winning bid. Therefore, variables 
TRIAL should be significant in the bid or premium equations. However, the coefficients of 
TRIAL1 and 3 are not significant except in the Taiwan olive bid equation. One possible 
reason is that when including other variables, the TRIAL variables become less important 
than other variables. Previous studies suggest that using only the data from the first trial to 
estimate parameters of bid regressions is better than using data from all trials, because the 
respondent’s bid for the next trial is often affected by the posted price from the previous trial. 
Therefore, we also estimated the parameters for bid regressions for preserved olives and 
oolong teas using data from the first trial. We noted that regression results based on data from 
all trials have more significant variables than those based on the first trial only. Also there are 
not many significant variables in the bid equations for olives and teas using data only from  
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the first trial. Therefore, using bids from all trials is more efficient than using only data from 
the first trial.   
Table 6 shows the marginal effect calculated from the parameter estimates of the bid 
regressions in Table 8. Since AGE, KID, NUM, FAH and FAFH are continuous variables, we 
use equation (5) to calculate the marginal effect. For other dummy variables, we use the 
difference between  ( | 0, 1) ii j Eyy x >= and ( | 0, 0) ii j Eyy x >= to calculate the marginal effect. 
In this section, we discuss the marginal effects for significant variables only. 
     The results for INFO2 show that respondents whose information is from the food 
package labels would bid more than other respondents by $7.4 ($3.69) for Taiwan preserved 
olives (Taiwan oolong tea). The marginal effect on RISK shows that respondents who think 
imported contaminated food is the most serious food problem in Taiwan are willing to pay 
$14.94 more on Taiwan tea and $8.59 less on China olives than those who do not. For 
BUYPF, respondents who purchase preserved olives frequently would pay $11.27 ($37.11 
and $40.44) less on China olives (China tea and Vietnam tea) than who do not. Since most 
respondents who purchase tea frequently may have a specific tea dealer, they may care less 
on COOL of tea and pay $18.1 less on tea we auctioned than those who purchase tea not as 
frequently. The marginal effect of CHECK shows that respondents who often check the food 
labels would pay $47.66 ($35.39) less on non-Taiwan tea than those who does not check food 
labels frequently. Though for both olives, respondents who often check the food labels would 
bid lower than who do not, but their bids on Taiwan olives were less than the China 
alternative. The marginal effect on Taiwan olives for GOV is $4.7, which means that 
respondents who believe in Taiwan government are willing to pay $4.7 more on Taiwan 
olives than those who do not think that Taiwan government is doing a good job on food safety. 
The variables SEX and AGE show that males tend to pay $2.94 and $3.03 more on China 
olives and tea, respectively, than females and respondents who are one year younger will 
increase (decrease) their bids by $0.51 ($3.52 and $1.3) for Taiwan olives (Taiwan tea and 
Vietnam tea). These results show that females are more concerned on COOL than males and 
respondents with different age shows different reaction on Taiwan olives and tea. The 
variable EDU3 shows that respondents who have college degree will pay $8.1 ($64.1) more 
on Taiwan olives (tea) than those whose education level is lower than college. The variable 
SECTION shows that respondents who did the auction first and CV question would increase 
his or her bid on Taiwan and China preserved olives (Taiwan, China and Vietnam teas) by 
$12.64 and $11.56 ($57.3, $46.13 and $41.05, respectively) more than respondents who did 
the CV survey first and auction later. The positive marginal effects of the ZONE2 (ZONE3)  
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on Taiwan, China and Vietnam teas are $21.39, $37.4 and $32.14 ($23.76, $8.13 and $3.42), 
which means that respondents from Taipei and Kaohsiung tend to have higher bids on tea 
than respondents from Taichung. 
 
 
Regression Results of CVM 
Table 7 shows parameter estimates for the contingent valuation model for preserved 
olives. These logit regressions are based on the responses from the follow-up questions. We 
exclude those who selected “indifference” and “neither of both products” in the first question, 
because the follow-up questions for the “indifference” and “neither” options were not asked 
to make further choices with specific price scenarios. For preserved olives, the logit results 
show that the estimated coefficients for variables CHECK, COOL, MAR, AGE, FAFH and 
△PRICE are significant. The negative sign of the △PRICE indicates that the higher the price 
is, the lower the utility of both Taiwan and non-Taiwan alternatives is. Furthermore, it implies 
that respondents are more likely to choose the non-Taiwan alternative if it is less expensive 
than the Taiwan product. The positive signs of CHECK and COOL mean that respondents 
who consider checking the labeling of food and country-of-origin of food as important tend to 
have higher utility on Taiwan olives relative to non-Taiwan alternatives. This is reasonable, 
since people put emphasis on what they consider important, the positive signs show that 
respondents who read food labels and country-of-origin of food prefer Taiwan olives more 
than China olives. They appear to believe that Taiwan olives are better than China olives. The 
negative signs of MAR, AGE and FAFH imply that respondents who are not married, 
younger and spend less on food away from home have higher aversion on Taiwan olives. The 
signs of the coefficients for AGE and FAFH are the same as the signs for AGE and FAFH 
appear in the auction results in Taiwan olive bid equation.   
     In order the estimate the WTP for teas under COOL, we would have had estimated a 
multinomial Logit model since there are three different teas – from Taiwan, China and 
Vietnam. Unfortunately the model has never converged even after we narrowed down to a 
few variables similar to those used for preserved olives. The main and perhaps the only 
problem for not getting convergence is that there are few choice switches when we 
discounted the prices for those teas which were not chosen in the first CV questions offering 
all teas with the same price. As noted earlier in the descriptive analysis (Table 7), only one 
respondent chose China tea and the rest chose Taiwan tea in the first question. In the second 
question, 59 respondents still chose Taiwan tea and only six respondents switched to 
non-Taiwan tea. Even with a 50% discounts for China and Vietnam teas, only one respondent  
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switched from Taiwan to Vietnam tea. Overall we have 118 paired choices and about 95% of 
observations did not change their preferences. With such a few respondents choosing 
non-Taiwan teas with discounts in the data set, the model just simply did not work. Note also 
the maximum discount that we offered in the CV questions is 50%. We can thus conclude that 
the willingness to pay premiums for Taiwan tea over both China and Vietnam teas are at least 
50% of the base price used in the first CV question. However, we would not be able to 
determine the upper bound for the WTP premium. This finding suggests that in order to 
obtain usable results, we should have offered more discounts, perhaps up to 70% or even 
90% to investigate whether the consumer has such a strong preference that they will never 
purchase China tea or Vietnam tea no matter how cheap they are. Of course, that should not 
be the case because we have observed that many of the participants in the auction 
experiments gave non-zero bids for China and Vietnam teas. The fact that the WTP for all 
three teas can be successfully estimated with experimental auction, but could not be estimated 




Table 8 presents all estimated premiums for Taiwan products. From auction 
experiments, for Taiwan olives and teas, estimated Taiwan product premiums based on the 
OLS parameter estimates are higher than the Tobit model and the unconditional auction. But 
it is not appropriate to compare in absolute value of Taiwan premium derived from the OLS 
regression, Tobit regression and the raw auction since there is no base price for auction bids. 
Therefore, we added a row of Taiwan premiums in percentage terms. The percentage 
premium of the Tobit model is calculated by the individual expected WTP. That is, the 
difference of the Taiwan product expected WTP and the non-Taiwan alternative is divided by 
the expected WTP of non-Taiwan alternative derived from the Tobit model. Specifically the 
estimated mean WTPs of Taiwan and China preserved olives are $46.81 and $29.61, 
respectively. The estimated mean WTPs for Taiwan, China and Vietnam teas from the Tobit 
model are $205.15, $115.15, and $103.54, respectively. Table 8 shows that the estimated 
percentage premium of the CVM is shown to be higher by factors of 1.15 and 1.14 than those 
from the Tobit model and raw auction data, respectively, for the preserved olives. Based on 
these results, there appears to be a considerable hypothetical bias.   
For oolong tea, as indicated earlier, we could not successfully estimate the needed 
multinomial Logit model from the CVM survey data. We can only conclude that the  
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willingness to pay premiums for Taiwan tea over China and Vietnam teas would be more than 
50%, but we could not get the mean estimate, nor the upper bound. Based on the data from 
the auction experiments, the Tobit model shows that the estimated WTP premiums for Taiwan 
tea over China and Vietnam alternatives are 78% and 98%, respectively which are higher than 
those unconditional means estimated directly from the raw data. The OLS estimates which 
are less credible are even higher. Overall these results show a strong preference of the 
Taiwanese consumer for both preserved olives and tea produced domestically over those of 




     This study attempts to use the auction experiment and CVM to explore the 
Taiwanese consumer’s preference for several selected foods produced in Taiwan vs. their 
imported alternatives. The study has important implications for the country-of-origin labeling 
legislation in Taiwan. The econometric results show that Taiwanese consumers have higher 
willingness to pay for Taiwan preserved olives and tea than the imported alternatives from 
China and Vietnam. It is clear that respondents are willing to pay more to avoid China and 
Vietnam alternatives. 
The results also show that the estimated Taiwan tea premiums in percentage terms are 
more than the estimated Taiwan preserved olive premium. Since food safety is the most 
important factor for these preference differentials, the results suggest that Taiwanese 
consumers are more concerned about the safety of tea than preserved olives. Results from the 
experimental auction show that higher educated respondents and respondents who think food 
label reading as well as imported contaminated food problems in Taiwan are important tend 
to have positive price premiums for both Taiwan olives and tea. If the respondents considered 
brand as an important factor for food purchasing, they would rely on the brand and neglect 
the importance of COOL, and therefore they tend to reduce the price premiums for Taiwan 
produced olives and tea. For oolong teas, respondents from Taipei and Kaohsiung have higher 
bids on teas than those from Taichung. 
The study also shows that the order of auction and survey as well as the order of the 
trial will affect the respondent’s bidding behavior, but it would not affect the respondent’s bid 
premium. Respondents who did the CVM questions fist and then auction later tend to lower 
his or her bids. The results from the affiliation test show that participants in the auction would 
tend to increase their bids for all the products when their last bid was lower than the posted 
second - highest bid. Therefore, it is very important to design the experimental auction  
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carefully. It would be an interesting task for the followers to design the order of the section 
well and to discuss how does the posted price affect the bids. 
     For the CVM questionnaire, almost every respondent chose Taiwan products when all 
products were offered at the same price. Even after a discount up to 50%, few switched to 
cheaper items in the follow-up question. The survey suggests that the Taiwanese respondents 
were not responsive to the price differences when they come to choices between Taiwan tea 
and those from China and Vietnam. Almost all Taiwanese respondents were not willing to 
accept Chinese or Vietnamese tea. Since the logit and the multinomial logit models require 
the data with sufficiently large proportions of respondents falling into each choice category, 
the parameters based on CVM are extremely difficult to estimate. To solve this problem, we 
should increase the price discount range to 70% or even 90% and also expand the sample size 
in future research. In order to elicit the WTP for the Taiwan tea as compared to its imported 
alternative in this study, the experimental auction is clearly superior to the CVM. 
    Since 59.5% of respondents think country-of-origin of food is a very important food 
attribute, the COOL legislation is important for Taiwan. The study also shows that if the 
government enacts a country of origin labeling law on preserved olives and tea, the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the Taiwan olives and tea relative to those from China and 
Vietnam, can than be revealed in the market place. Taiwanese consumers would definitely 
benefit from this labeling legislation. Since Taiwan product premiums in percentage terms are 
more than 50%, we would offer suggestions on COOL to the Taiwan government. First, since 
only 5% of respondents are very well informed about COOL in the study, the government 
should spread the information on the existing COOL law more progressively to the public. It 
can be done through building website for COOL and giving propaganda and lectures to the 
public. Second, according to the study, respondents who think food label and imported 
contaminated food problems in Taiwan are important tend to have positive price premium on 
Taiwan olives and tea. Therefore, adding the country-of-origin labels on non-packaged food 
would help the competitiveness of Taiwan products. Third, education is shown to be a very 
important factor affecting consumer purchasing behavior. Specifically, respondents with 
college degree would bid $8.1 more on Taiwan olives and $64.1 on Taiwan tea than 
respondents with lower education level. With increasing emphasis on education in Taiwan, 
the payoff for COOL legislation would increase in the future. 
     The United States and Japan and many other countries have more rigorous COOL law 
than Taiwan. They enacted MCOOL not only on packaged food but also on unpackaged food 
as well as fresh products. Therefore, Taiwan should take them as a role model to improve its  
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current COOL law.   
     In summary, imported contaminated food has become a threat to food safety for 
Taiwanese consumers since Taiwan joined the WTO in 2002. Many foods or related products 
we consume are found to be contaminated, such as bleaching chopsticks from China, 
pesticide residuals from Vietnam tea. We should urge the Taiwan government to enact the 
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Table 1. Affiliation Test Results 
Preserved Olives  Oolong Tea  Variable 
Taiwan China  Taiwan  China  Vietnam 






























N 140  140  140 140 140 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * indicate that the variables are significant at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels,   




Table 2. Variable Definitions and Sample Mean from Experimental Auction and CVM 
V a r i a b l e   N a m e                      D e f i n i t i o n   a n d   c o d i n g   M e a n   S . D  
Dependent Variables  …..Experimental Auction….. 
Ot  The bids of respondents for the Taiwan preserved olives (NT$)  48.56  25.44
Oc  The bids of respondents for the China preserved olives (NT$)  31.46  23.07
Tt  The bids of respondents for the Taiwan oolong tea (NT$)  206.58  120.6
Tc  The bids of respondents for the China oolong tea (NT$)  118.54  86.78
Tv  The bids of respondents for the Vietnam oolong tea (NT$)  107.97  75.54
 …..Contingent  Valuation  Method….. 
Y(binomial)  1 if Taiwan preserved olives are chosen; 
0 if China preserved olives are chosen.  0.833 0.375
Y(multinomial)  1 if Taiwan oolong tea is chosen; 2 if China oolong tea is chosen; 
3 if Vietnam oolong tea is chosen.  1.077 0.553
      
Independent Variables  …..Experimental Auction….. 
Choice of First Question 
NTW  1 if non-Taiwan products are chosen; 0 otherwise. 
TW  1 if Taiwan product is chosen; 0 otherwise. 
IND  1 if non-Taiwan and Taiwan products are equally good initially; 0 otherwise. 
Trial 
Trial1  1if the bid is the first bid of the respondent; 0 otherwise. 
Trial2  1 if the bid is the second bid of the respondent; 0 otherwise. 
Trial3  1 if the bid is the third bid of the respondent; 0 otherwise. 
  
 …..Contingent  Valuation  Method….. 















Table 3. Common Independent Variables, Definition and Coding 
Variable 
Name  Definition and Coding  Mean  S.D. 
Information 
INFO1  1 if very well/somewhat informed about COOL; 0 otherwise.  0.769  0.424 
INFO2  1 if information is from the food package; 0 otherwise.  0.187  0.392 
RISK  1 if imported contaminated food is the most important issue; 0 otherwise.    0.782  0.416 
Attitude and perception 
BUYPF  Frequency of preserved fruit 
purchasing.  0.923 0.268 
BUYTEA  Frequency of tea purchasing.  rarely  or  never    if   0
 week; a   once   if or     weeks in two   once








BUYOG  Frequency of organic food 
purchasing.  0.462 0.502 
CHECK  Check the labeling of the food. rarely or  never    if   0






BRAND Brand.  0.705  0.459 
PRICE Price.  0.449  0.501 
FRESH Freshness.  1  0 
SAFETY Food  Safety.  0.987  0.113 
COOL Country-of-origin  labeling.  0.872  0.336 
NUTRI Nutrition.  0.859  0.35 
ENVIR Environmental  consciousness. 0.679  0.469 
CONVEI Convenience.  0.628  0.486 
COLOR Color.  0.423  0.497 
CALORIE Calorie. 
so   -   so or  important 
not   important, not very    if   o
s; respondent   for the important 
somewhat  very /  be    to considered
















GOV  1 if the government’s regulatory performance is excellent or good; 
0 otherwise.  0.256 0.439 
Demographic 
SEX  1 if male; 0 otherwise.  0.303  0.446 
MAR  1 if marriage; 0 if single.  0.744  0.439 
AGE  Age of respondent as of 2007.  44.077  10.71 
KID  Number of kids under age 15.  0.77  1.092 
NUM  Number of persons per household.  3.718  1.553 
VEGE  1 if the respondent is a vegetarian; 0 otherwise.  0.104  0.307 
BMI  1 if BMI≦24 (Normal or slim figure); 0 if otherwise.  0.423 0.497 
EDU1  1if Elementary school; 0 otherwise.  0.051  0.222 
EDU2  1 if Completed high school; 0 otherwise.  0.551  0.3 
EDU3  1 if >college; 0 otherwise.  0.398  0.493 
MINC  Monthly Income of each respondent ÷1000.  41.026  71.32 
INC  1 if Average income of the household in Year 2007≧680,000;  
0 if otherwise.  0.513 0.503 
FAH  Monthly food expenditure at home per household÷1000.  12.635  7.051 
FAFH  Expenditure of food away from home per household÷1000.  5.262  4.664 
ZONE1  1 if respondent is from Taichung; 0 otherwise.  0.324  0.47 
ZONE2  1 if respondent is from Taipei; 0 otherwise.  0.34  0.48 
ZONE3  1 if respondent is from Kaohsiung; 0 otherwise.  0.34  0.48 
Survey versions 









Table 4. Unconditional Auction Results, Total Sample 
Preserved Olives Oolong Tea  Item 
Taiwan China Taiwan China Vietnam 
Mean Bid (NT$)  46.71 29.43 200.27  113.22  110.01 
S.D 25.44 23.07 120.59  86.78  75.54 
Max Bid (NT$)  200  160  720  500  400 
Number of Respondents Biding Zero 9(12%) 39(52%) 9(12%) 30(40%) 24(32%) 
Number of Irrational Respondentsa  4 4  4 4  4 
Sample Size  70  70  70  70  70 




Table 5. Regression Results on Bids and Premiums   
for Preserved Olives and Oolong Teas, Experimental Auction 
Preserved Olives  Oolong Tea 
















































































































































































































































































Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * indicate that the variables are significant at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are estimated standard errors. Blank space indicates that the variable is not applicable. N is the number of observations.  
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Table 5. Regression Results on Bids and Premiums   
for Preserved Olives and Oolong Tea, All Trials, Experimental Auction (Continued) 
Preserved Olives  Oolong Teas 
































































































































































































































σ  25.46 
(20.33) 
23.02 





(62.87) -  - 
N  210 210  210  210 210 210 210 210 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * indicate that the variables are significant at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels, respectively. Numbers in 























Table 6. Marginal Effect for Olives and Tea, Experimental Auction 
Preserved Olives Oolong Tea 











INFO2 1  or  0  7.4  -0.99 3.69  -5.31 -0.81 
RISK 1  or  0  -1.69  -8.59 14.94  -4.73 -6.05 
BUYPF  1  or  0  -6.48 -11.27 -8.48 -37.11 -40.44 
BUYTEA 1 or 0  2.86  1.21  -18.1  4.74  6.98 
BUYOG 1  or  0 -0.61  3.39  17.37  21.29 24.79 
CHECK 1  or  0  -6.42  -9.37 -35.38 -47.66 -35.39 
BRAND 1  or  0 -4.62  -3.11 -5.78  -2.76 -5.25 
NUTRI 1  or  0  4.76  4.81  2.47  19.04 -1.89 
ENVIR 1  or  0  2.81  2.24  -1.36  9.44  -8.64 
COLOR 1  or  0  -10.53 -1.72 -24.72 0.91  0.18 
CALORIE 1 or 0  -1.75  -3.18 27.9  16.82 12.81 
GOV 1  or  0  4.70  -0.63 -55.65 -7.57 5.15 
AGE Year  old  -0.51  -0.16 3.52  0.93  1.30 
SEX 1  or  0  -1.73  2.94  -18.10 3.03  -1.11 
MAR 1  or  0  -5.69  -0.95 33.29  3.45  6 
EDU3 1  or  0  8.10  -0.96 64.1  8.74  16 
KID Head  -5.18  -5.76 -12.10 -17.80 -5.45 
NUM Head  -1.49  2.71  1.72  10.12 8.12 
FAH NT$  0.85  0.06  -4.87  -5.15 3.98 
FAFH NT$  -0.25  -0.08 3.98  3.56  1.54 
VEGE 1  or  0  5.37  -0.95 6.67  -32.50 -21.56 
BMI 1  or  0  11.31  6.43  9.28  -0.60 11.41 
INC NT$  -3.58  -1.70 10.35  -12.10 -15.19 
SECTION 1 or 0  12.64  11.56 57.30  46.13 41.05 
ZONE2 1  or  0  1.13  4.85  21.39  37.40 32.14 
ZONE3 1  or  0  2.02  0.01  23.76  8.13  3.42 
TRIAL1 1  or  0 -5.66  -2.97 -18.40 -10.98 -8.20 
TRIAL3 1  or  0 4.62  2.72  14.13  4.61  7.00 
  
 
Table 7. Parameter Estimates for 
Preserved Olives, CVM 
Preserved Olives (Logit)  Variables 
Taiwan vs. China 
Intercept  3.89 
(3.41) 
CHECK  2.56** 
(0.87) 
COOL  1.98** 
(0.76) 
MAR  -1.85** 
(0.93) 
AGE  -0.24** 
(0.09) 
FAFH  -0.66** 
(0.27) 
Price △   -0.67** 
(0.31) 
N 69 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * indicate that the 
variables are significant at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels, 
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are estimated 
standard errors. N is the number of respondents.  
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Table 8. Estimated Premiums for Taiwan Products over Alternatives 
 CVM     Auction   
Item 
  Logit or 
Multinomial Logit   Unconditional
















% Premium    67%
c   58.35%  58.1%  67.5% 
N
b   69    70  70  70 
…..Oolong tea
e….. 
   CH  V    CH  V  CH V  CH  V 
Mean 












% Premium    50%~∞ 50%~∞  77.12% 82.05% 78.15%  98.13% 87.4%  99% 
N   65    70    70  70 70 70 
a The unconditional auction mean is the mean computed from the raw auction bids. 
b N is the number of respondents. 
c Percentage premium of Contingent Valuation is computed by dividing the point of willingness to pay by the 
base prices in the questionnaire. 
d Percentage premium of OLS is computed by dividing the average raw auction bid for non-Taiwan product.   
e CH and V denote China and Vietnam, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 